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51. Introduction
Do intrinsically motivated people always work harder? Should jobs be always
enriched? Should the remuneration of challenging jobs be closely contingent on
performance? These queries are among the most salient issues in the field of human
resource management and are of primary concern in real business practice. Likewise,
there is an increasing interest in understanding the economic fundamentals of work-
related issues, which has led to the development of the economics of personnel as a new
field of research1.
Economic analysis has made important contributions to the study of the
employment relationship. Its chief propositions come from agency theory. In the
principal-agent model, one party (the employee) agrees to undertake an activity in the
interest of the other (the employer) in exchange of remuneration. The employee is
averse to hard work so that he is willing to shirk in the absence of incentives that align
the interests of both parties. Given that the employee is assumed to be exclusively
induced by the remuneration provided by the employer, the setting of the appropriate
monetary rewards becomes the central issue when designing employment contracts2.
The basic economic analysis of the employment relationship is then based on the
general assumption that economic actions are performed by self-interested individuals
purely motivated by monetary incentives. Unlike psychologists (see Deci, 1975 and
Staw, 1976 among others), economists have not given much importance to the fact that
an employee may work for something more than just a paycheck.3 As a result, intrinsic
motivation tend to be absent from the formal economic analysis. Furthermore, it is
rarely recognized that self-interest is not always material.
However, as we will show in this paper, the assumption that people only react to
monetary incentives does not provide a rich enough picture of the human behavior to
permit one to discuss the nature, consequences and economic outcomes of the
employment relationship. Moreover, it may result in misleading implications thus
                                                       
1 Lazear (1995) overviews the most significant advances in this field.
2 See Prendergast (1999) for a comprehensive survey of this literature.
3 Some clear exceptions to this are the works of Frey (1992,1994,1997a,b), Kandel and Lazear (1992),
Kreps (1997) and Casadesus-Masanell (1999).
6narrowing the relevance of economic analysis to the study of practical human-resources
issues.
In this paper we analyze the provision of incentives at work on the basis that the
employment relationship is not solely an exchange of work for money. Particularly, in
addition to a salary, a job also gives access to a work experience, which, as discussed in
Section 2 below, determines the potential for employee’s human capital acquisition and
for his social and professional recognition. Accordingly, we argue that the level of
access defines the employee’s opportunities for satisfying his self-actualization and
achievement needs. Further, given that the firm has the ability to regulate access by way
of a number of organizational decisions, access becomes a powerful mechanism to
activate the worker’s internal motivation. We analyze the economic consequences of
our arguments on access through a model of agency enriched with a number of
psychological and organizational considerations. To that effect, we extend the
pioneering model of Kandel and Lazear (1992) on peer pressure in partnerships to the
analysis of the effect of access and intrinsic motivation on employee’s performance and
job’s design.
Our results and conclusions are consistent with much of the interdisciplinary
research on the subject, as well as with the evidence emerging from the real business
practice. They also provide a number of practical implications for personnel policies.
First, in order to activate the individual’s internal motivation, the job requires to reach a
minimum value. Second, the positive effect of the employee’s intrinsic motivation on
effort decreases with the magnitude of monetary incentives. Third, the efficiency gains
generated by the extension of job’s access increase with the employee’s level of
perceived risk. Finally, the costs of selection are a consequence of granting access.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the concept and the
motivating function of access. Section 3 analyzes the outcomes of considering the
motivational role of access in the traditional principal-agent context. Section 4 presents
some results of comparative statics and establishes a number of propositions. Section 5
identifies the costs incurred in the process of giving access. A conclusions section
completes the paper.
72. Access as a motivational device
The firm basically grants access every time it offers an employment contract.
Thus, in addition to a salary, any job provides its occupant with one workspace, where
the employee interacts with people and equipment, is integrated into a number of
procedures, workflows and routines and exercises a given decision-making capacity. In
other words, it offers a work experience through which the employee develops a number
of operational, contextual and intellectual skills that produces both general and specific
human capital. Consequently, the degree of access determines the opportunities for
human capital acquisition from the on-the-job experience.
The notion of access as provider of experiences is also present in Rifkin (2000).
This author argues that the Internet will give rise to a radical change in the way firms do
business, as shifts their primary role from suppliers of physical goods to suppliers of
access to experiences. Thus, in a “weightless” economy products are becoming
indistinguishable from services, while experiences (not things) are marketed and sold
and consumers are increasingly gaining access instead of property.
By contrast Rajan and Zingales (1998) use the notion of access to analyze the
source of power in organizations. They define access as “the ability to use, or work
with, a critical resource. If the critical resource is a machine, access implies the ability
to operate the machine; if the resource is an idea, access implies being exposed to the
details of the idea; if the resource is a person, access is the ability to work closely with
the person”  (p. 388). The authors argue that an employee who is given access has the
ability to create a critical resource: his specialized human capital, for which the firm has
not an easy substitute. Consequently, the employee’s control over this critical resource
is a source of power that makes himself valuable within the organization.
In any case, the concept of access becomes especially significant in our time
where the physical capital is being replaced by the human capital as the main source of
value creation. Moreover, the firm regulates the degree of access that it gives to its
employees through the organization of the production, which act on the workspace
through the description and design of jobs. For example, the level of access within the
context of mass-production is substantially lower than that provided by a flexible
organization of production. Under a traditional work organization each job has a
narrowly specified description and tasks are sharply differentiated across jobs. By
8contrast, flexible production systems imply new work practices such as job rotations,
self-managing teams and quality circles, designed to create multi-faceted employees
with abilities to solve problems under a variety of contingencies4. Similarly, the broader
job space provided by the so-called High-Commitment Human Resources Management
(Baron and Kreps, 1999), provides a richer work experience and in consequence, greater
opportunities to acquire human capital.
The opportunity to acquire human capital is not the only source of value that
comes from access. It may also produce informative signals that are valuable to the
employee because they enhance his visibility and with it, affecting his status through
additional social and professional recognition. To the best of our knowledge, the term
visibility within the context of access, has not been treated in the literature. In some type
of organizations, the informative value of the access can be particularly important. For
example, let us think in terms of a young journalist who is hired by a big TV network to
present the news broadcast. Or a young actress who for the first time obtains the starring
role in a worldwide launching movie. Or a football player or coach who signs up with a
leading club in the Premier League. In all these cases, the revaluation of the employee’s
status is a consequence of the visibility provided by the employment.
The value of the enhanced visibility largely depends upon the contracting firm.
For example, when a recent Ph.D. is hired by a prestigious university the value of the
signal is itself very high because it is recognized that in order to belong to this
university the candidate must be particularly brilliant. In general, reputable
organizations create high-value jobs because of the information they provide about the
employees’ competence to occupy such jobs. Paraphrasing Rajan and Zingales (1998), a
firm’s reputation undoubtedly is a critical resource and employees of good-standing
organizations are given the ability to use, or work with, this critical resource. In the
same way, firms use the promotion policy to increase the access of their employees. In
general, the higher the position in the hierarchy the higher the visibility of the
employee’s performance and consequently the higher the opportunities to improve his
professional standing. At the same time, the promotion up the vertical hierarchy also
                                                       
4 Aoki (1988), Koike (1994) and MacDuffie (1995) among others, analyze the abilities acquired by the
employees under a flexible production system and its implications for firm’s performance.
9implies new tasks and responsibilities and, therefore, enhances the opportunities to
acquire more human capital.
Our argument at this point is that when an individual is given a larger access
then he may feel an internal pressure to take advantage of the opportunity of self-
actualization that the job offers. As a result, the individual is willing to put a higher
effort on his work to extract the job’s full potential. Further, it seems reasonable to
assume that a broader access also requires more effort to make good use of the wider
range of possibilities that the employment provides. In order to illustrate this idea, let us
consider an example from the academic world. Let us assume that a research group is
designed to include both young and prestigious senior researchers. As a result, a young
fellow is in closing contact with reputable researchers and exposed to their ideas and
intellectual discussions; in other words, he is given access. In this working environment,
the junior researcher recognizes that the greater his personal effort, the more he can take
advantage of the knowledge and experience of his senior colleagues. In the same way,
the higher the visibility and the recognition he can achieve.  He may also experience
some disutility if he does not work enough to take full advantage of the learning
opportunity that the employment offers. This disutility reflects the job’s value that the
young researcher could have acquired but which, because of his scant personal effort, is
in fact squandered.
In general, the broader the access the more it enhances the job’s value in terms
of its increased potential for the individual’s self-actualization. Though most people
have some disposition to improve themselves, the intensity of this motivation may vary
across individuals. Hence the intangible worth of access is determined by the strength of
the individual’s achievement needs. The need for achievement is particularly relevant
for the analysis of economic behavior and has been the subject of a number of studies
that investigate its relationship with some economic issues such as the entrepreneurship
(Andrews, 1967) and the economic growth (McClelland, 1961). The pioneering works
by Maslow (1954) and Argyris (1957) also remark the importance of the individual’s
need of self-actualization in motivating human behavior. Murray (1938) describes the
achievement attitude as “the need to accomplish something difficult, to master,
manipulate or organize physical objects, human beings or ideas. To do this as rapidly
and as independently as possible. To overcome obstacles and attain a high standard. To
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surpass oneself. To rival and outdo others. To increase self-regard by the successful
exercise of talent” (p.164).
These self-actualization and achievement needs are at the core of the
individual’s intrinsic motivation to work. Hence, people may behave rationally and self-
interestedly when they work hard, even without a clear economic reward. Access
becomes a crucial mechanism to activate this source of intrinsic motivation because of
the opportunities it provides for personal fulfillment. Of course, access serves to
improve (or just to maintain) the worker’s employability and it might be claimed that
this would lead to higher expected monetary rewards in the future. However, a higher
employability also increases the possibility of achieving a more creative or stimulating
future employment, even though badly-paid. Indeed, as Frey (1997a) points out, very
often the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is not clear-cut and in
most cases the two motivations come together.
In summary, the higher the potential value that the job offers and the higher the
effort required to achieve it. Then, if an individual with certain interest for his self-
actualization put a low effort into his work, he incurs in a disutility because of the value
he fails to achieve. Many studies have confirmed that people experience feelings from
what they do5. Conversely, we focus on the feelings that people experience from what
they do not do.
3. An agency model with access and intrinsic motivation
Under an agency contract the agent (the employee) agrees to act in the interest of
the principal (the employer). The agent must execute an effort eÎ[0,ç] to undertake the
activity. The principal cannot observe the effort that the agent puts into the job and only
observes the employee’s outcome. Let q= e+x be the agent’s output where x is the
random variable that stands for the state of the world. Assume that x is normally
distributed with zero mean and variance s2. The agent is then paid according to R(q).
We assume the agent has the following utility function with a constant absolute risk
aversion coefficient denoted by r:
                                                       
5 Also, people have feelings for those they work with (Rotemberg, 1994).
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u = -exp {-r ( R(q) – C(e) – P(a, d, e))} [1]
where R(q) is the remuneration function, c(e) is the agent’s cost of undertaking the
activity and P(a,d,e) is the pressure function.
The employee’s disutility increases with effort c´(e)> 0 at an increasing rate
c´´(e)> 0. Without loss of generality let us assume that c(e)= e2. Let R(q) = w + b(e + x)
be the remuneration scheme offered by the principal, where w is a fixed payment and b
is a commission rate (0<b<1). Finally, P(a, d, e) is a function of the degree of access
aÎ[0,1] and the parameter d ³ 0 that captures the strength of the individual’s
achievement attitude.  Following Kandel and Lazear (1992) the pressure is expressed as
P= d [ê(a) - e]2 [2]
In this expression ê(a) represents the benchmark effort that enables the
individual to exploit the full potential embedded in a job with access a. As argued
above, we assume that high-access jobs are more demanding in terms of the level effort
required to achieve the job’s potential value, so that ê'>0, ê(0)=0 and 0< ê(1) £ ç.
Beyond that, the results of the paper are applicable to all functional forms of ê (a),
irrespective of the sign of the second derivative ê’’.6
From this perspective, ê(a0) can be interpreted as an indirect measure of the
highest opportunities for self-actualization provided by an employment with a degree of
access a0. Assuming some positive achievement attitude d>0, lower levels of effort,
e<ê(a0), result in neglected opportunities for self-actualization and consequently the
employee internalizes some utility losses. Therefore, the model recognizes the firm’s
ability to activate the employee’s motivation for achievement through its decisions on
access (a), which indirectly determines the benchmark effort/value of the employment
ê(a). Similarly, the greater the personal interest for self-realization, the higher the
pressure felt by the individual. In other words, a larger d amplifies the employee’s
opportunity losses.
                                                       
6 We could assume that the benchmark effort increases with access either at an increasing rate (ê’’>0) or
at a decreasing rate (ê’’<0). For example, one possible formulation of ê(a) could be given by ê=a l with
l >1 representing the former case and with 0<l<1 the latter.
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Pressure enters into the utility function as a minus because it represents the
psychological cost of the unsatisfied need for achievement provided that d>0. Note that
d=0 is the underlying assumption in the traditional agency model. Further, the
functional form of P(×) in [2] should reflect the fact that the individual may experience
disutility when deviating from ê(×) in either direction. Thus, reduced effort causes the
loss of self-regard felt by the individual from failing to take advantage of an opportunity
for personal fulfillment. By contrast, effort above ê(×) may indicate an insufficient level
of access that causes employee’s frustration because he feels he is wasting his career.
In our model, the pressure depends both on the strength of the individual’s
psychological characteristics and on the opportunities for achievement that the job
offers. This formulation is consistent with the psychological view that the effect of
personality depends on the particular context of behavior (Mischel, 1968). That is, both
person (d) and situation variables (the degree of access a) influence the employee’s
behavior.
On the other hand, this way of modeling is adapted from the Kandel and
Lazear’s (1992) pioneering analysis of peer-pressure in partnerships. However, unlike
those authors’ interpretation, in our presentation the pressure is self-imposed rather than
social. This pressure arises without the need for team monitoring and it is only
necessary that the individual feels a certain internal drive for his own growth and
personal development. In this respect, we consider that individuals are exclusively
motivated by selfish considerations –both monetary and non-monetary-, and not
necessarily committed to any social norm or ethical standard7.
Incorporating the earlier formulation into [1], the certainty equivalent for a risk
averse agent is given by
U = w + be - e2 - (1/2)kb2 – d [ê(a) – e]2 [3]
To simplify notation rs2= k. Then, k represents the level of perceived risk by the agent.
As in most of the literature, the employer is assumed to be risk neutral. Thus his
certainty equivalent of effort e is given by the expected outcome less the employee’s
expected remuneration:
V= e – (w + be) [4]
                                                       
7 See Casadesus-Masanell (1999) for an analysis of the effect of social norms and ethical standards.
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In this context, given that the principal cannot observe the agent’s effort e, the
agent chooses the level of effort that maximizes his utility. The first-order condition for
employee’s utility maximization implies the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint:
)1(2
)(eˆ2
e
d
adb
+
+
= [5]
The principal should maximize his expected utility by choosing the
remuneration parameters b and w, as well as the degree of access a. Further, he has to
take into account the consequences of the contract he offers on agent’s decisions, which
requires the inclusion of the agent’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints
in the principal’s problem below
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The participation constraint states that the contract must allow the employee to
achieve a level of expected utility at least as great as U0, which is the utility he would
get form working elsewhere. Without loss of generality we assume that U0 = 0.
The resulting equilibrium contract {êa*, ba*, wa*} is shown in Table 1, together
with the effort the agent actually executes e*, which is computed by introducing the
optimal values ba* and êa* into the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. The total
certainty equivalent W=V+U of the relationship is shown in the last column. Table 1
also reports the results obtained under the standard agency contract and those of under
the assumption of perfect observability of effort.
 [Table 1 about here]
The results in Table 1 reveal that the employer should set an access coefficient
that determines a benchmark effort equal to the efficient effort (êa*= 1/2). Concerning
the remuneration parameters, the employer sets a smaller variable commission (ba< bs)
and a higher fixed payment (wa > ws) than those offered in the standard agency contract.
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The immediate effect of this compensation schedule is the reduction of the agent’s risk
costs.
Further, provided that d > 0 the effort the employee executes is higher (ea > es).
Though the first best is never attainable because of the unobservability of the effort,
giving access reduces the inefficiency of the standard model of agency (W >Wa>Ws).
Finally note that as d approaches ¥ (0) the solution becomes the first best (the standard
model): the employee executes the efficient effort e = ½ (e= es), the maximum total
welfare would be achieved W=¼ (W=Ws), and the principal might eventually remove
the monetary incentive b=0 (increase to b=bs).
4. Comparative statics and implications
In this section we perform an analysis of comparative statics in order to obtain a
number of propositions with clear practical implications for human resources policies.
Proposition 1. Employees with positive achievement attitude (d>0) will put a
lower level of effort into a low-value job than those employees with no needs of
achievement (d=0).
According to the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint in expression [5]
above, when access a=0 and ê(0)= 0 then  e = b / [2(1+d)].
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward: with a lack of access any
effort exerted by an intrinsically motivated employee is doubly onerous. On the one
hand, he feels the “physical” cost of the effort. On the other hand, the psychological cost
caused by the dissatisfaction of working in a job that does not give him any opportunity
to fulfil his expectations.  By contrast, employees without any internal urge to excel
themselves - as assumed in the standard model of agency- only incur the physical cost
of their work experience.
Proposition 2.  The higher the individual’s achievement attitude the higher his
effort, provided that the value of the job reaches a minimum level.
From [5], it is easy to see that
2
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The proposition highlights Frey’s (1994) reasoning that the more interesting a
task is for the agents, the higher is their intrinsic motivation to perform well. For the
same reason, hidden, narrow and repetitive work, such as might be the typical
monotonous and routine job of a traditional production line, would not arouse such
motivation.
Proposition 3. The setting of high monetary incentives can undermine or
“crowd out” the power of the employee’s intrinsic motivation
A look at expression [7] above shows that the positive effect of the internal
motivation on effort decreases with the extrinsic incentives (b). Consequently, if the
firm sets high-powered extrinsic incentives it does not exploit the potential embedded in
the intrinsic motivation. The trade-off between extrinsic incentives and internal
motivation can also be confirmed in the determination of the optimal commission ba* by
noting that it decreases with the agent’s internal motivation (¶ba / ¶d < 0).
Our results are then consistent with the arguments on the substitutive role of
both kinds of incentives (Frey 1997b; Kreps, 1997). In this respect, employees in high-
value jobs should not be provided with extensive monetary incentives since it can lead
to lessened levels of effort and lower net profits for the employer.
Proposition 4. People with weak needs for achievement react more intensively
to the monetary incentives than those with a strong internal urge to excel themselves.
From 0
)1(2
1e >
+
=
¶
¶
db
 we see that the increase of the level of effort generated by
increasing monetary incentives is smaller as the higher is the individual’s internal
motivation.
Proposition 5. The efficiency gains generated by the introduction of access
increase with the agent’s level of perceived risk.
This follows from 0
k
)WW( s >
¶
-¶ a  The riskier the employee’s perception of the
environment the more costly are monetary incentives and the more profitable is
broadening access to extract effort through intrinsic motivation.
Intuitively, in a dynamic and uncertain environment knowledge can quickly
become obsolete. In such a context, the broader access granted by the firms with high
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commitment work organization systems provides the employee some degree of security
by offering the possibility to update his knowledge and to maintain his level of
employability.
5. Access and the cost of selection
For the present we have highlighted the implications of giving access for the
design and the outcome of the employment relationship. Particularly we have shown the
increase of the employee’s effort as a consequence of the motivational effect of access.
However, one important research question still remains: is always in the employer’s
interest to give access? Is there any cost associated to access? If so, which is the nature
and the amount of such costs? In this section we further examine all these issues.
Let us suppose one employer recruiting an employee. The employer cannot
directly observe the type d of the employee, i.e. the individual’s psychological
characteristic d constitutes his private information. Assume there are only two possible
values for d: d1= 0 and d2 = ä >0. In the following, we will call motivated the employees
of type 2 and apathetic the employees of type 1. The employer has to decide which
employment contract offers to the candidate. On the one hand, he can propose the
standard agency contract with restricted access and the standard remuneration schedule
{0,bs,ws} reported in Table 1. Alternatively, he can offer an employment with access
and with the remuneration parameters corresponding to a type 2 employee with d2 = ä
{1/2,ba,wa}.
Proposition 6. The standard agency contract self-selects workers: it only
attracts apathetic workers and keeps the motivated ones away.
If the employer offers a standard contract and the employee is of type 1, the
relationship will result in the standard agency outcome (U1,V1), as reported in the top
left square in Table 2. In contrast, the standard contract would derive a negative utility
(U2) for an employee of type 2, even though he would execute a lower effort than that of
the apathetic worker, i.e. e2 < e1. The motivated employee would never accept such a
contract and the employer’s utility becomes V2 = 0.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
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Proposition 7. From the perspective of the employee, access is always welcome
both from the motivated workers and from the apathetic workers.
Unlike the previous case if the employer offers {1/2,ba,wa} both employee types
are willing to accept the contract since U3>0 and U4 =0 in Table 2. Moreover, it is
preferable to the standard contract since U3>U1 and U4 >U2.
The employer makes the highest profits (V4) and extracts the highest level of
effort (e4 > e1 > e3 > e2) when he offers {1/2,ba, wa} and the worker is of type 2.
Nevertheless, if the worker is of type 1 he makes lower profits than by offering a
standard contract (V4 > V1 >V3). Therefore, the employer would be willing to offer
{1/2,ba, wa} only if he is able to distinguish between the two types of workers. In other
words, the determination of d becomes crucial when granting access. The absence of
employee’s self-selection stated in Proposition 7 obliges the employer to invest in
selection tasks in order to identify the worker’s type.
Given that the intensity of the achievement attitude may vary substantially
across individuals, procedures to measure the individual strength of this attitude occupy
a central role in the selection procedures.8 This reasoning is also coherent with the value
that firms with high-access practices attach to hire employees who exhibit a high
capacity and willingness to learn (Baron and Kreps, 1999). Note that with the standard
contract selection is irrelevant because employees self-select (U2<0).
Proposition 8. The maximum cost an employer should incur in the selection
procedure is given by the difference between the utility he achieves by giving access to
a motivated employee and that obtained with a restricted-access contract, that is:
( ) ( )[ ]d
d
+++
=-
1k21k21
kVV
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14  [8]
A look at [8] reveals that the higher the employee’s perceived risk and the higher
the motivation the firm is looking for, the more is the firm willing to spend in the
selection tasks.
                                                       
8 According to Antonides (1996), the most important instrument to measure the need for achievement is
the Thematic Apperception Test.
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6. Conclusions
Currently many firms are seeking to build their competitive advantage on the
basis of the excellence of their human resources. This strategy has led to the increased
saliency of new systems for work organization and human resource management
amongst the firms operating in the USA and the EU throughout the 1990s (Osterman,
2000; ILO, 1999). A crucial consequence of such organizational innovations is the rise
in the degree of access that firms give to their employees. In this paper we have argued
that this practice activates a different motivation from the purely monetary. Particularly,
a broad-access job allows the employee to satisfy his self-actualization needs by
offering a chance to update his human capital and/or to increase his professional
standing.
Through an agency model we have showed that there are efficiency gains to be
achieved by increasing access to intrinsically motivated individuals. Additionally, we
have showed that high-access jobs should not be paid with extensive variable payments
because of the existence of a trade-off between monetary and non-monetary incentives.
Likewise, the agent’s personal characteristics are crucial to get the results that the model
anticipates. The risk of giving access to the wrong candidate –i.e. to a non-motivated
employee, constitutes the essence of the costs associated to the task of recruiting and
personnel selection. These findings highlight the complementarities between (i) the
design of the workplace and the employee’s compensation, and among (ii) these two
and the selection process. On the other hand, they justify the central role played by the
selection procedures in those firms that adopt high-commitment human resources
practices.
In summary, the paper has confirmed many of the arguments about the trade-off
between intrinsic and monetary incentives. Additionally, we have formulated a number
of propositions about personnel policies that are subject to be tested empirically, which
justifies further research.
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